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Industrial Trade Secrets, Their Use and
Protection
by G. G. Maruchnics*
The trade secret problem today.
NDUSTRIAL COMPETITION today is so acute in many instances
that very often a few pennies in the selling price of a product
or a service, or its quality or lack of it, one way or the other,
spells success or failure in the sale of that product or service.
Frequently the price or quality of such product or service is de-
termined by information gained through painstaking effort on
the part of a company, by its so-called "know-how," by equip-
ment refinements, by new invention and processing methods, and
by other means all of which are to a greater or lesser degree
kept from the inquisitive eye of competitors and others not
directly concerned with the operation. These methods, informa-
tion, inventions, and the like, are categorically referred to as
trade secrets.
Because of the great part that such trade secrets play in the
success of many industrial endeavors, the courts have been
called upon on many occasions to resolve controversies of liti-
gants concerning such secrets.
The cases most often appearing before the courts involve the
relationship of employer and employee, or former employee. Out
of this relationship arise the questions of ownership and use and
misuse of alleged confidential information or trade secrets. Other
relationships have also been considered by the courts, and the
questions considered are in many respects overlapping. The big
question is to determine what is a trade secret so that the courts
can protect such trade secrets.1
Definitions of trade secret.
Courts and writers have spent much time in discussing and
defining a trade secret. Because of the involvement of such an
expression and the complexity of the task, an exact definition is
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difficult, and some courts and writers have found it more expe-
dient to define by exclusion those things which are not trade
secrets,2 or by setting up guide posts to determine whether some
particular information that has been given is a trade secret.3
While the defining of a trade secret has not been an easy task,
there are numerous definitions, many of which are substantially
variations of an often quoted Ohio case which formulated the
following: 4 "A trade secret is a plan or process, tool, mechanism
or compound, known only to its owner and those of his employees
to whom it is necessary to confide it in order to apply it to the
uses for which it is intended."
Requirement of a trade secret.
The first consideration given in the analysis of a trade secret
problem is to the question of secrecy, for a trade secret must, in
its very nature and from its very definition, involve to some
degree an element of secrecy. Matters of public or general
knowledge cannot form the basis of a trade secret, and there can
be no secret in those instances where the alleged trade secret
is revealed by the product which the complainant markets. 5
Because one calls a matter a trade secret is not conclusive; other
circumstances considered in the light of this claim are considered
by the courts in weighing this phase of the problem. Hence, the
element of secrecy is comparative, and the nature of the trade
secret is not material, if in fact the secret is of importance to
the business and is so regarded by the owner.6 However, a trade
2 Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout et al., 25 N. J. Super. 591, 96 A. 2d 788 (1953).
3 Mycalex Corporation of America v. Pemco Corporation et al., 64 F. Supp.
420 (D. C. Md. 1946).
4 The National Tube Company v. Eastern Tube Company et al., 13 Ohio
Circuit Decisions 468, affirmed 69 Ohio St. 560 (1903). Other definitions are:
"A 'secret' is nothing more than a private matter; something known only
to one or a few and kept from others. It may be acquired by lawful means,
as by discovery, or even by unfair means, without tracing title to the
originator, and when so acquired it does not necessarily cease to be a secret
which may be protected from unlawful competition." Kaumagraph Co. v.
Stampagraph Co. Inc., et al., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1923).
"A trade secret is not mere knowledge or the efficiency of experience. It
is not mere skill in manipulation. A trade secret may consist of formulae,
patterns, machines or processes of manufacturing for continuous use in the
operation of a business." Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout et al., 25 N. J. Super.
591, 96 A. 2d 788 (1953).
5 Carver et al., v. Harr et al., 132 N. J. Eq. 207, 27 A. 2d 895 (1942).
6 Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss et al., 173 Minn. 342, 217 N. W. 339 (1928);
Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach et al., 239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913).
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secret or confidential relationship cannot be imposed without
notice that the information is imparted in confidence; it cannot
arise without consent.
A trade secret, by the foregoing definitions, need not have
such novelty as would be required for patentability, and whether
the secret is patentable or not or protected by trade mark is
immaterial.7 However, they must be the particular secrets of
the complaining owner not general secrets of the trade in which
he is engaged.8
The six point trade secret test.
As suggested above, an exact definition of a trade secret is
difficult, hence the courts have found it helpful to formulate
guide posts. Some of the factors considered in determining
whether some questionable information that is given is a trade
secret are: (1) how extensively the information is known out-
side the particular business; 9 (2) how extensively it is known by
employees and others in that business;10 (3) how much effort
was put forth by the owner to guard his secret; 1 (4) how valu-
able was the information to the owner and to his competitors; 12
(5) how much effort and money was expended to develop the
secret; 13 (6) how difficult or easy would it be for another to
honestly acquire the same secret. 14 However, the fact that the
7 "It seems quite clear that while a secret may involve such novelty as is
required for patentability; and a secret, to be protected, must contain such
element of value or usefulness, yet a trade secret need not involve such
novelty as would make it patentable," Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co. et
al., 104 F. Supp. 162 (D. C. Del. 1952); A. 0. Smith Corporation v. PetroleumIron Works Co., 73 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1920); Holland Stock Remedy Co. v.Independent Chemical Co. et al., 17 Ohio Dec., Nisi Prius 207 (1906).
s Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Williamson Heater Co., 269 F. 614 (6th Cir.1920); The Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, Jr. et al., 93 Ohio App.507, 114 N. E. 2d 149 (1953); Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. John B. Dodds
et al., 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 154 (1887).
9 Mycalex Corporation of America v. Pemco Corporation et al., 64 F. Supp.
420 (D. C. Md. 1946).
10 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 757, Comment b.
11 American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N. E. 911 (1912); Petnel
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. et al., 280 App. Div. 706, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 294(1952).
12 Mycalex Corporation of America v. Pemco Corporation et al., 64 F. Supp.
420 (D. C. Md. 1946).
13 Mycalex Corporation of America v. Pemco Corporation et al., supra
note 12.
14 Carver et al., v. Harr et al., 132 N. J. Eq. 207, 27 A. 2d 895 (1942).
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secret was easy to duplicate does not militate against its being
a trade secret. The important point is that the owner and those
to whom it was necessary to reveal the secret knew of the trade
secret.
Burden of proof.
As in the usual case, where the one who asserts the affirma-
tive has the burden of proof, so too, in the law of trade secrets
the one claiming the secret as his own and that another has
violated such secret must show 15 (1) that there was a trade
secret or a secret process of manufacture; (2) that it was of
value to the owner and important in the conduct of his business;
(3) that by reason of his ownership or discovery the owner of the
secret had a right to its use or enjoyment; (4) that the secret was
communicated to the defendant, while he was in a position of
trust and confidence, under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable and unjust for him to disclose it to others or to make
use of it himself, to the prejudice of the owner.
Trade secrets by court determination.
The courts, over the years, have been called upon on numer-
ous occasions to determine what is and what is not a trade secret.
The court in The National Tube Company case 16 in general terms
expressed a formula for the determination of trade secrets within
the realm of industrial activities. This definition included plans,
processes, tools, mechanisms and compounds; however, other
confidential information has been dealt with by the courts, 17 and
the 6 factors for the determination of trade secret information,
as enumerated in the Mycalex Corporation case,18 are often used
15 Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Schnelbach et al., 239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913).
16 13 Ohio Cir. Dec. 468 (1903).
17 Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 P. 1180 (1913) -Laundry
list by civil statute, confidential information; The Home Steam Laundry Co.
v. Thomas S. Smith et al., 8 Ohio Nisi Prius, New Series 402 (1909)-
Laundry list held to be confidential information; but cf.: Fulton Grand
Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922)-Laundry list held
not to be a trade secret; Curry v. Marquart et al., 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N. E.
2d 868 (1937)-Milk customer list not a trade secret; Pestel Milk Co. v.
Model Dairy Products Co. et al., 39 Ohio Law Abs. 197, 52 N. E. 2d 651
(1943)-Milk company route salesman's activities held to be not confiden-
tial; Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Sperry, 169 F. 926 (S. D. N. Y. 1909)-
Business records held to be trade secrets.
is Mycalex Corporation of America v. Pemco Corporation et al., 64 F. Supp.
420 (D. C. Md. 1946).
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to resolve the question. But, the knowledge and skill which a
person obtains or procures through his experience are not con-
sidered to be trade secrets, and merchandising methods are not,
and cannot be, trade secrets, 19 and, the term "trade secret" is not
used, or is rarely if ever used to denote, the mere privacy with
which an ordinary commercial business is carried on.20
Trade secrets differentiated from patents.
Trade secrets and patents are two separate and totally dis-
tinct legal matters. It seems quite clear that while a trade secret
may involve such novelty as is required for patentability and a
secret, to be protected, must contain such element of value or
usefulness yet a trade secret need not contain such novelty as
would make it patentable. The protection given to a trade secret
is independent of the patent laws and covers not the invention
itself, but the secrecy of the information under the given set of
circumstances, since the secret, if patented, would be made public,
and the inventor is protected by letters patent from infringe-
ment.21 However, as soon as anyone fairly and honestly discovers
a trade secret either by examination of the manufactured prod-
ucts sold or offered for sale to the public, or in any other honest
way, that person has full right to use it. That is the risk the
owner takes, and if he would have further protection, he must
seek a patent. Hence, though the trade secret need not be patent-
able so that a court would grant protection, yet it may have such
novelty and invention as would entitle it to letters patent. Should
the owner nevertheless prefer not to have a patent issued, his
trade secret will be protected only so long as he can keep others
from learning of the secret through honest means. Hence, it is
conceivable that there may be property rights in trade secrets
that may be greater than that afforded patents, and the protec-
tion will be by injunction or other equitable relief, but not by a
patent suit. While a party may not recover damages for the ap-
propriations of secret processes for which patents have been is-
sued, since the right to secrecy and to patent monopoly are incon-
sistent, mere filing of applications for a patent is not a dedication
of the secret to the public.
19 79 C. J. S. 935.
20 79 C. J. S. 935.
21 The National Tube Company v. Eastern Tube Company et al., 13 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 468 (1903); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. et al., v. Cox, 50
N. Y. S. 2d 643 (1944).
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Protection afforded against the violation of a trade secret.
Once it has been established that a given matter constitutes
a trade secret, the next problem of pressing importance is the
enforcement of the right to remain unhindered in the use of such
trade secret. With this problem arise other allied problems con-
cerning the origin of an obligation to honor another trade secret,
the determination of what constitutes a violation of this obliga-
tion, and the means by which one may protect against such viola-
tions.
The obligation not to disclose trade secrets arises from some
confidential relationship. Hence, the starting point for trade
secret protection is an examination of this relationship. The un-
derlying theory of the considered cases is that under a particular
set of circumstances a relationship of confidence may arise by
operation of law, even though there is no express agreement that
the matters divulged will be held in confidence, 22 and it is this
confidence that gives rise to a duty not to use or divulge the
secret to the detriment of the owner. However, no such con-
fidence arises where knowledge of the trade secret is gained by
honest and lawful means, 23 as by examination of the manufactured
products sold or offered for sale, and, if the confidence ever
existed, it ceases to exist upon the owner's giving publication to
his trade secret. Liability attaches to one who discloses or uses
another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, if he has used
improper means to effect his discovery, 24 or through a breach of
confidence, or through a third person with knowledge that the
latter has not acted in good faith or through a mistake of the
owner with knowledge of this fact.2 5 Relief is granted to protect
the secret only where one is attempting to use or disclose it in
violation of some general duty of good faith such as a breach of
contract or abuse of confidence. 26 Since a secret is nothing more
22 International Industries, Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp. et al., 99 F.
Supp. 907 (S. D. Del. 1951).
23 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N. E. 2d 667 (1946); Wireless
Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., Ltd., et al., 239 Mass. 158,
131 N. E. 307 (1921)-Knowledge acquired honestly of a patentable but
unpatented invention is not a violation of such confidence; Case v. Thomas
et al., 5 Ohio Law Abs. 308 (1927); See also: Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass.
190, 23 N. E. 1068 (1890).
24 Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
25 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 757.
26 Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C. Cir. 1951);
Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N. E. 2d 667 (1946).
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than a private matter, something known only to one or a few and
kept from others, it may be acquired by lawful means, as by dis-
covery or even by unfair means, without tracing title to the
originator, and when so acquired it does not necessarily cease to
be a secret which may be protected from unlawful competition. 27
However, knowledge acquired honestly of a patentable but un-
patented invention is not a violation of such confidence. The
secret may be absolute or relative, yet the same principles apply.
These principles, on the confidential relationship of the
parties to determine their obligations one to the other, extend
also to the assignee of a trade secret, and he, being the new
owner, may enforce his rights in the trade secret against the
assignor, former owner. 28
Protection afforded the owner of a trade secret against
employees and former employees.
The majority of trade secret cases considered by the courts
have dealt with parties occupying the employer-employee rela-
tionship. The problem in most instances involves an allegation
by the employer that the employee has exploited the former by
carrying off and using to the employer's detriment some trade
secret or other confidential information. In the consideration of
these cases the courts have formulated the general rule that the
duty to refrain from such exploitations arises from the relation-
ship of employer-employee and the implied promise that the
employee will not divulge confidential information gained in the
course of his employment or use it to his employer's prejudice.2 9
It is further said that there is subsisting between employer and
employee a quasi-contract, arising out of every contract of em-
ployment that the employee will hold sacred any trade secrets
or other confidential information which he acquires in the course
of his employm.nent 30 and such duty of the employee is an absolute
not a relative duty. 31 The fact that he left his employ is immate-
27 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co. Inc., et al., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E.
485 (1923).
28 Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (1910); 43
C. J. S. Sec. 148.
29 Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newbury et al., 119
N. Y. S. 2d 324 (1952).
30 Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner et al., 99 N. Y. S. 2d 592 (1950).
31 Patterson v. Pollock et al., 84 Ohio App. 489, 84 N. E. 2d 606 (1948);
Byrne et al. v. Barrett, 268 N. Y. 199, 197 N. E. 217 (1935).
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rial since the duty continues after the employment as well as
during its continuance. However, unless restricted by some agree-
ment with his former employer, one's right to compete in business
with such former employer is the same as that of a stranger to
the contract of employment, subject to the above general rule,
and an employee upon leaving the employment has a right to
use his general knowledge, experience, memory, and skill as long
as he does not use or disclose any of the secret processes, which
the employer was entitled to keep for its own use, and to which,
as against him, it had exclusive property rights. Though an em-
ployee has no right to sell a trade secret evolved by his em-
ployers, nor to sell his services to another with the added value
of this secret, the employee may make use of any idea he has in-
vented, even though such invention was made in the course of
his employment and at the employer's expense,3 2 unless he was
hired to invent such secret or transfer it by contract,3 3 and the
employer does not own it and can claim no further interest in it
than the product of the skill, industry and intelligence of the
employee.
Protection under express contract.
Not infrequently employers, in an effort to protect themselves
and to obviate later legal entanglements, stipulate, as part of the
employment contract, certain restrictive covenants which have
for their purpose the control of employee conduct during or after
termination of employment. Restrictive covenants in employment
contracts are of two kinds: (a) one not to accept employment
from others during the term of the contract, and (b) one not to
engage in a similar business or accept employment with a com-
petitor for a fixed time after the termination of the original con-
tract.34 The objective of each contract is different; in the first
type it is to enforce employment with the employer, in the second
type it is to avoid unfair competition. Both of these objectives
very often are directed to the purpose of protecting the employer's
trade secrets. Each of these contracts is in a degree a restraint
32 Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., Limited, et al.,
239 Mass. 158, 131 N. E. 307 (1921).
33 Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., Limited, et al.,
239 Mass. 158, 131 N. E. 307 (1921); American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass.
229, 97 N. E. 911 (1912); Eastman v. Reichenbach et al., 20 N. Y. S. 110 (1892).
34 Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 141 A. 542 (1928).
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of trade, since the public has an interest in the services of such
employees.
The underlying principle upon which the modern cases upon
this subject are grounded is that although one cannot stifle com-
petition by a bargain having that purpose only, yet when he pur-
chases something, or acquires some right, the value of which
may be affected by the subsequent conduct of the seller, the pur-
chaser may lawfully obtain the stipulation of the seller that he
will refrain from such conduct.35
Many courts of last resort have held that an agreement im-
posing restraints upon the right of an employee to engage in a
competing service after the termination of the contract of service
are analogous to, and governed by, the same general rule ap-
plicable to restrictive covenants in the sale of a business and good
will.36 However, no contractual restraint of trade is enforceable
at common law unless the covenant embodying it is merely an-
cillary to some lawful contract (involving some such relation as
vendor and vendee, partnership, employer and employee) and
necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legiti-
mate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from those dangers
of unjust use of those fruits by the other party. The main pur-
pose of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed,
and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard for determining the
reasonableness and validity of the restraints. But where the sole
object of both parties in making the contract is merely to restrain
competition, and enhance and maintain prices, the contract is
void.3 7 This is true notwithstanding the public policy which in
general holds competent contracting parties to bargains made by
them with their eyes open.38 There is, however, an antagonistic
policy which proscribes any contract that would bring about an
unreasonable restriction of the liberty of a man to earn his living
or exercise his calling.39 In order that such restrictive covenants
in employment contracts be enforced it must be shown: (1) that
the contract was a prerequisite of the employment or was sup-
35 S. Jarvis Adams Co. v. Knapp, 121 F. 34 (6th Cir. 1903).
36 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N. E. 277 (1935).
37 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., et al., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.1898); Gates-MacDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 33 Ohio Law Abs. 481, 34 N. E.
2d 443 (1941).
38 Simmons v. Fried, 302 N. Y. 323, 98 N. E. 2d 456 (1951).
39 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N. E. 277 (1935); Taylor
Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, et al., 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908).
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ported by other consideration,40 (2) the purpose to be obtained
is fair and reasonable,4 1 (3) the restriction does not injuriously
affect the public,4 2 and (4) the enforcement of the restriction is
necessary for the protection of the employer's business.4 3 The
chief criterion for determining the validity of these restraints,
however, is the reasonableness of the contract,44 and the restric-
tion is said to be good if it is confined within limits which are no
larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom the
contract is made may reasonably require, and there can be no
enforcement of a contract for personal services which forbids
the employee to divulge any confidential information, known to
him or acquired during his employment relating to the trade
secret, which is unlimited as to time and place.45 Clearly the en-
forcement of such restrictions injures the employee, and the ques-
tion, therefore, narrows itself to the determination of the necessity
for the protection of the employer's business. If such necessity
exists in fact, then it overrides the injury to the employee.
Though public policy favors enforcement of the contract of
competent contracting parties, and though such contract objec-
tively appears fair, a contract of employment prepared by em-
ployer's attorneys would be construed most strongly against the
employer, particularly where the employee had no legal advice.
Protection in absence of contract.
Though employment under express contract is highly de-
sirable and is often the case, nevertheless a great number of em-
ployment relationships arise wholly without the aid of written
40 McCall v. Wright, 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516 (1910).
41 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., Inc., et al., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E.
485 (1923).
42 John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A. 2d 548 (1951); but see: 0. W. Thum
Company v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 140 (1897)-Public policy
does not require the avoidance of a contract by an employee not to disclose
secrets which must necessarily be imparted to him by his employer to
enable him to do his work.
43 John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A. 2d 548 (1951); Kaumagraph Co. v.
Stampagraph Co., Inc., et al., 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1923).
44 Western Maryland Dairy Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 23 A. 2nd 660
(1942); Red Star Yeast & Product Co. v. Hague, 25 Ohio App. 100, 157 N. E.
393 (1927); Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland Inc. v. Witter, 62
Ohio Law Abs. 17, 105 N. E. 2d 685 (1952); Inboden v. L. W. Hawker, Inc., 35
Ohio Law Abs. 303, 41 N. E. 2d 271 (1941).
45 Tolman Laundry Inc. v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936)-it is said
that "such a restraint savors of servitude, unrelieved by an obligation of
support on the part of the latter (employer)"; Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v.
Nichols, et al., 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908).
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contracts. Hence, it becomes a matter of serious importance to
such parties to know what, if any, provisions exist for an implied
contractual agreement. Legal recourse in trade secret cases is
not limited to causes of action arising wholly out of written con-
tract, the law which protects an employer from unfair competi-
tion is broader than that, and there is subsisting between the em-
ployee and employer, in the absence of a written contract, a quasi-
contract that the employee will not use the information which he
acquires while in the employment, after he has left it, to destroy
the business of his employer.46 Even in the absence of a clause
in a contract which prevents the use of information of this charac-
ter in that way, the law throws about the business and about the
property of the employer a protection which prohibits the im-
proper use of information to the detriment of the employer. 47
Among the detrimental effects considered by the courts are the
damage resulting to the employer from misuse and abuse of con-
fidential information and trade secrets of the employer.48 The
courts have said that where a confidential relation exists between
two or more parties engaged in a business venture the law raises
an implied contract between them that the employee will not
divulge any trade secret imparted to him or discovered by him
in the course of his employment, and that a disclosure of such
secrets is a breach of trust and a violation of good morals, to pre-
vent which a court of equity should intervene. 49 It is further
said that a written contract merely expresses the implied con-
tract, implicit in the relationship of the parties, that one who
enters into such an employment will not carry elsewhere into
competition with his employer confidential knowledge obtained
from him.50
While the evidence of an implied contract giving the employer
the exclusive right as against the discoverer of an invention should
46 White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 172
(1930); but see: H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 109 N. W. 483
(1906).
47 White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 172
(1930).
48 Curry v. Marquart et al., 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N. E. 2d 868 (1937).
49 The Cleveland Worm & Gear Co. v. Mayhew E. Noyes, 17 Ohio Nisi Prius
Reports, New Series 529 (1915); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton et al., 202
M. 592, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 429 (1952); Eastman v. Reichenbach et al., 20 N. Y. S.
110 (1892).
50 Stone et al. v. Goss et al., 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (1903); Little v.
Gallus et al., 4 App. Div. 569, 38 N. Y. S. 487 (1896).
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be clear and satisfactory, as otherwise the inventor would be de-
prived of the benefit of his discovery to which he would be rea-
sonably entitled on leaving the employment, if the facts of the
case lead clearly to the conclusion that from the acts and conduct
of both parties it was intended that the process or formulas dis-
covered during the employment should belong to the company
alone, the contract should be enforced.51
However, in the absence of restrictive covenant no implied
obligation rests on an employee not to disclose or use the trade
secrets of the employer that have not been entrusted to him in
confidence, and under such circumstances, an employee who has
quit the service of his employer may use in his own business or
the business of another, his experience, skill, acumen, memory
and general knowledge gained while in the service of the em-
ployer. This use is permissible so long as the employee does not
resort to fraud or unfair business practices.
Protection outside the employment relationships.
Though the cases most frequently encountered involve em-
ployer and employees, the courts have found occasion to deal
with other relationships. Protection has been accorded an owner
of a trade secret against the new employer of the former em-
ployee 5 2 against the vendor of the trade secret 5 3 against the
licensee under an agreement not to publish the secret 54 and the
fact, however, that another has legitimately discovered the trade
secret will not permit one to whom a confidential disclosure has
been made to violate the confidence, where the matter has not
been generally disclosed by any of the discoverers so as to have
become public knowledge and property.
Protection against disclosure in court during litigation.
The result of controversies involving trade secrets is often a
court room hearing. Hence, the problem presents itself as to
51 Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293, 78 A. 698 (1910); but see:
Recording & Computing Machines Co. v. George Nath et al., 75 Ohio St.
603, 80 N. E. 1129 (1904).
52 Westervelt et al. v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N. E.
552 (1900); Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co. et al., 147 App. Div.
715, 132 N. Y. S. 37 (1911).
53 Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 169 Mo. 388, 69 S. W. 355
(1902).
54 L. M. Rabinowitz & Co., Inc. v. Dasher et al., 82 N. Y. S. 2d 431 (1948).
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how the trade secret can be protected and yet its disclosure not
made public. Some courts have permitted the owner to refuse to
divulge his alleged trade secret on the claim of personal privi-
lege.55 However, the words of Justice Holmes, as used in the
E. I. DuPont case,56 seem to sum up the problem well. "Whether
the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he
accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot
be. Therefore, the starting point for the present matter is not
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiff, or one of them. These
have given place to hostility, and the first thing to be made sure
of is that defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the trust im-
posed in him. It is the usual incident of confidential relations. If
there is any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiff's
secrets, he must take the burden with the good."
Judicial relief available to owner.
Once the right to a trade secret has been found in favor of
a claimant, the court must then grant some judicial relief to the
aggrieved. The relief is ordinarily equitable in nature, and, as
in the usual equitable suit, the courts will assume jurisdiction
only where it is shown that the legal remedy is inadequate5 7 and
that some property right of the claimant has been violated58 This
grant of equitable relief has been founded upon two theories:
(1) the prevention of unfair competition, and (2) the prevention
of unjust enrichment59
55 Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 134 F. 241 (S. D. Ohio 1904); The PerfectMeasuring Tape Co. v. Notheis, Jr., et al., 93 Ohio App. 507, 114 N. E. 2d
149 (1953).56 E. I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Walter E. Masland et al., 224 F.
689 (3rd Cir. 1915); Griffin Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gold Dust Corp., et al., 245 App.
Div. 385, 282 N. Y. S. 931 (1935).
57 Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, et al., 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908).58 Harold et al. v. Harold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911 (6th Cir. 1919);
Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout et al., 25 N. J. Super. 591, 96 A. 2d 788 (1953);Sandusky Foundry & Machine Co. v. Wood, 1 Ohio Law Abs. 409 (1923);Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. John B. Dodds et al., 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 154(1887); but see: Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton et al., 202 M. 592, 115 N. Y. S.2d 429 (1952)-"liability under these circumstances is predicated on thebreach of this duty rather than on a specific property right of plaintiff."59 Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co. et al., 104 F. Supp. 162 (D. C. Del.1952); International Industries, Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., et al., 99F. Supp. 907 (S. D. Del. 1951); but see: Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial
Review Co., et al., 147 App. Div. _715, 132 N. Y. S. 37 (1911)-"Equity has
no power to compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate
of his memory."
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It may now be accepted as settled law, under authority of
American cases that courts of equity, if the facts warrant, will
restrain an employee from making disclosures or use of trade
secrets communicated to him in the course of his employment,
hence, the remedies granted by the courts, both of law and equity,
have taken the form of injunctions,6 specific performance of con-
tracts not to compete 1 or not to reveal trade secrets, 62 account-
ing and declaration of a trusteeship63 and damages.
64
Defenses available in a trade secret action.
While the courts have gone to considerable lengths to protect
the owner of a trade secret from unfair dealings, they have, never-
theless, refused to grant relief where the complainant through his
own doing, has placed himself in a position where equity and
justice dictate the denial of relief. Such denial follows the volun-
tary publication of the trade secret, either by the display of the
product or by divulgence for purposes of sale or contract.65 The
normal result of disclosure is competition, and others then are
free to join in the scramble for business. Courts view with dis-
favor those who delay unnecessarily in the enforcement of their
legal rights (laches),66 and upon those who allow their ideas to
stagnate until another has found a use for them (non-user),67
and upon those whose conduct in the pursuit of their business
would cast a barrier before their path to legal protection (es-
toppel) .68
60 Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Products Co., 31 F. 2d 293 (S. D. Ill. 1929);
Nuldmoline Co. v. Stromeyer, 299 F. 597 (3rd Cir. 1918); Vulcan Detinning
Co. v. American Can Co., et al., 77 N. J. Eq. 387, 87 A. 91 (1907); Fairchild
Engine & Airplane Corp., et al. v. Cox, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 643 (1944).
61 Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N. E. 2d 667 (1946); but see: Tawney
et al. v. Mutual System of Maryland, Inc., et al., 186 Md. 508, 47 A. 2d 372
(1946); Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 192 A. 359 (1937).
62 Stone et al. v. Goss et al., 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (1903); Eastman v.
Reichenbach et al., 20 N. Y. S. 110 (1892); White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 172 (1930); The Cleveland Worm &
Gear Co. v. Mayhew E. Noyes, 17 Ohio Nisi Prius Reports, New Series 529
(1915); George W. Seifried v. John C. Maycox, 14 Ohio Dec. 536 (1904);
Sterling Varnish Co. v. Macon et al., 217 Pa. 7, 66 A. 78 (1907).
63 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 542, 73 A. 603
(1909).
64 Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 138 (1946).
65 Carver et al. v. Harr et al., 132 N. J. Eq. 207, 27 A. 2d 895 (1942); Apple-
bee v. Skiwanek, 27 N. C. R. 78, 140 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1912); Tabor v.
Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889).
66 Globe Ticket Co. v. International Ticket Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 605, 104 A. 92
(1918).
67 Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff et al., 299 fll. 532, 132 N. E. 806 (1921).
68 Germo Mfg. Co. v. Coombs, 209 Mo. App. 651, 240 S. W. 872 (1922).
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